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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                                                      
   v.
DARYL DOUGLAS DENNISON,
                                                                Appellant.
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Middle Pennsylvania
(05-cr-00405)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 25, 2008
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: August 4, 2008)
OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Daryl Douglas Dennison (“Dennison”) was sentenced to 180 months’
imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release, a fine of $2,100 and
costs of prosecution for distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
After filing a notice of appeal, Dennison’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw
representation along with a brief arguing that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Dennison submitted a pro se brief
in response.  For the following reasons, we will grant counsel’s Anders motion and affirm
the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence against Dennison.
I.
Since we write for the parties, we will set forth only those facts necessary for our
analysis.  On February 15, 2006, represented by his first court-appointed attorney, a
four-count indictment was filed against Dennison charging him with: (1) being an armed
career criminal in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(e); (2) possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) conspiring with co-defendant LaToya Ross to traffic 50
grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (4) possession of
firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation if 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and
(ii).  On August 8, 2006, Dennison’s second attorney, who had replaced Dennison’s
original counsel and had been privately retained, negotiated a joint plea agreement
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between the government and both Dennison and Ross.  The agreement stated that
Dennison would plead guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The government agreed to recommend a
three-point reduction in his offense level for Dennison’s acceptance of responsibility.  
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) that
determined the base offense level to be 32 for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The report
also established that, as a career offender, Dennison was placed in Criminal History
Category VI.  After taking into account the 3-point reduction, the PSR recommended a
Guidelines sentence of 151-188 months.  The government and Dennison agreed to
suggest a 180-month sentence to the court; the parties further agreed that if this sentence
was imposed, the government would drop all local charges pending against Dennison in
York County, Pennsylvania, for a separate offense.  
In August 2006, Dennison, represented by his second attorney, appeared before the
District Court and entered a guilty plea.  At these proceedings, the District Court asked
Dennison if he was “satisfied with the representation [he] received from [his] counsel to
date” to which Dennison replied “yes, ma’am.”  (Appendix (“App.”) 54.)  The District
Court also explained to Dennison that he would be waiving certain legal rights, and
Dennison affirmed that he was aware of the plea agreement details.  The District Court
then detailed the sentencing guidelines and the maximum sentence for the charges against
Dennison.  After the government explained that it was recommending a sentence of 180
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months per the plea agreement, the District Court asked the defendant if that was his
understanding of the plea agreement, and Dennison responded in the affirmative.
When Dennison appeared for sentencing on December 11, 2006, he expressed his
desire to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial.  Thereafter, his second attorney was
granted permission to withdraw his representation due to an irreconcilable conflict with
Dennison.  Eventually, and pursuant to the advice of his third attorney (who was
appointed by the court), Dennison once again decided to move forward with the joint plea
agreement.  
At sentencing, Dennison did not object to the plea agreement.  The District Court
then sentenced Dennison to 180 months’ imprisonment.  After his sentencing hearing,
Dennison again expressed to his attorney his desire to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Thereafter, Dennison’s attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentence, which
was denied by the District Court.  Dennison’s counsel now files a motion to withdraw
representation along with an Anders brief arguing that Dennison has not raised any
non-frivolous issues on appeal.  
II.
In Anders v. California, “the Supreme Court established guidelines for a lawyer
seeking to withdraw from a case when the indigent criminal defendant he represents
wishes to pursue frivolous arguments on appeal.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296,
299 (3d Cir. 2001).  These guidelines are reflected in our local appellate rules, which
 In his pro se brief, Dennison argues: 1) that he is innocent; 2) that his guilty plea1
was involuntary; 3) that he was unaware of the consequences of the plea; 4) that his
sentence was unreasonable; and 5) ineffective assistance of counsel.  We have reviewed
his claims in addition to those raised by his attorney and find that they are without merit.
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provide that, “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is persuaded
that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, trial counsel may file a motion to
withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.”  Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a).  “If
the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant trial counsel’s Anders
motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  In evaluating an
Anders brief, we must determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s
requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any
non-frivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001)
(explaining local appellate rule 109.2 (a)).
The first requirement of the Anders brief inquiry is that counsel must “satisfy the
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and
. . . explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.  Dennison’s appellate
counsel has filed an adequate Anders brief, which demonstrates a thorough examination
of the record on appeal.  The brief adequately lays out the factual and procedural history
of the case, and identifies several topics which could give rise to an appealable issue, as
well as addresses issues raised by Dennison’s pro se brief.   First, the counsel’s brief1
considers whether Dennison’s post-sentence claim of innocence is frivolous.  Second, the
-6-
brief addresses whether Dennison knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea. 
Third, the brief discusses why Dennison’s sentence was reasonable and thus the reason
that his request for sentence reconsideration is frivolous.  Finally, the brief correctly states
that this is the incorrect forum for Dennison’s claim that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.  After reviewing counsel’s thorough brief, and the accompanying
materials, we are satisfied that there are no appealable issues. 
Next, we consider the second Anders requirement and conduct an independent
review of the record; it reveals that, as counsel has represented, there are no non-frivolous
issues presented on appeal.  An issue is not frivolous “if [the court] finds any of the legal
points arguable on their merits.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 743.  Dennison stated under oath
that he had possessed with intent to distribute crack cocaine during the time specified. 
The government, when discussing the sentencing agreement, set forth ample evidence
that demonstrated Dennison’s involvement in the crimes.  We are satisfied that Dennison
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered the guilty plea, after the District Court
informed him of his rights and the consequences of his plea.  Additionally, it was clear
that Dennison understood the plea agreement and the charges brought against him, and
had reviewed both with counsel.  See United States v. Tannis, 942 F.2d 196, 196 (3d Cir.
1991).  
Finally, we are satisfied that the District Court’s sentence, which fell within the
 Dennison’s argument that his counsel was ineffective is not an argument2
considered by this court on direct appeal.  United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268,
271-72 (3d Cir. 2003).  We defer this claim to a collateral proceeding.  Id.
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Guidelines range, was properly calculated and imposed.2
III.
Accordingly, we will grant counsel’s Anders motion and affirm the judgment and
sentence of the District Court.
